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In the Supreme Court of Iha Stale of Utah 
It\LE W. DEMILLE, Administrator 
(11' tile Jj~state of Terry Lee DeMille 
aml Constance Hope DeMille, also 
known m; Connie DeMille, deceased, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
l'lfYLLTS ERICKSON, Administratrix 
uf the Estate of Frederick Kenneth 
'-lpe11rllovP, ch•ceased, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
11385 
i>LA INTIFF AND RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STA'l1El\1ENT OF CASE 
T\'l'I')' LP<' De::\[ille and his wife, Constance Hope De-
.\! ill<', and dt>fernlant's d<'cedent, Frederick Kenneth 
:-ipr·ndlon•, ·wL•re killed August 11, 1965, when their auto-
11111hi!Ps collided on U. S. Highway 191 thirteen or four-
11' 1 ·11 mi l<>s son th of Cedar City. The DeMilles left two 
•11 1110r el1ildn•n surviving, a daughter, Lisa Lee DeMille, 
1
., 1• :-;ix. and a son, 'l'erry Greg DeMille, age two. Plaintiff 
:'1 11 11;.d1t :-;uit as Admini:-;trator on behalf of the two minor 
'
11 ildr<·n to n·eovPr damag<•s for the wrongful death of 
"''II' Jl<ll"<'llt:->. 
2 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
At the close of the evidence, defendant moved the 
Court to find Terry Lee DeMille negligent as a matter of 
law and to dismiss the action for failure to prove negli-
gence on the part of Frederick Kenneth Spendlove. 'l\.rn 
Lee De Mille was driving the DeMille car. The Trial Conrt 
granted defendant's motion as to Terry Lee DeMille and 
instructed the jury that no recovery could be had for hio 
death as a matter of law (Instructions 12 and 13). Thl' 
Court submitted the case to the jury as to the wrongful 
death of Constance Hope DeMille and the jury retnrnPtl 
a verdict in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $23,000.00. 
Defendant's post trial motion for judgment n.o.v. \\'ao 
deniPd. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a reversal or a new trial and pla[n-
tiff seeks to have the judgment affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff is in general agreement with most of tl 11 
facts stated in ddendant's brid. IIo-wever, tlwrn an• S\'' 
eral significant omissions and inaccuracies therein "-hi"i' 
n'quire C'orrection. 
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Officer Mason testified the morning of the accident 
1rns clear and visibility was good (Tr. 20, 28). He ob-
~l:'.rved Terry Lee DeMille and Constance DeMille at the 
Phillips station in Cedar City at 6 :30 or 6 :40 a.m. on the 
111orning of the accident. They were dressed up, their 
automohile was clean and Terry Lee DeMille was wide 
a\\'ake and normal. (Tr. 16, 18). The accident was re-
portPd at 6 :55 a.m. (Tr. 23). Officer Burch testified that 
vitlihility from the wrecked vehicles on the highway was 
~cvPcral hnndred yards both north and south of the scene 
(Tr. 28). There was nothing to obstruct the vision of 
Mr. Sp(•ndlove in seeing the De~ifille vehicle coming from 
tiH•north (Tr. 72). 
Officer Burch constructed a diagram before the jury 
,110\\'ing the physical facts found after the accident. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 5). This diagram and photographs 
(Plaintiff's Exhibits G and 8) show the scene of the ac-
1·i1lPnt as it appeared from the north looking sonth (Tr. 
·r ').o "") 
..... / l ·)l~, ,-)-;-} • 
Ol'ficer Burch testified that a sharp gouge mark 
11mubered Point 6 on Exhibit 5 was nearest the center 
1.1hite line•. It ran to the edge of the white line (Tr. 51, 54). 
'l'ltp white line was five inches wide (Tr. 30). In the 
i1;1in1on of Sergeant Reid, this gouge was made by a sharp 
1101'1ion of the undercarriage of the Volkswagen being 
d11\'Pn b;,, defendant's decedent when the undercarriage 
' 11' t]1p \Tolkswagen collapsed (Tr. 169, 171). Plaintiff's 
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Exhibit 13 is a close-up photograph of this mark. Offo.et 
Reid testified it \Vas made by a sharp portion of the fraiw; 
and not by the left front wheel (Tr.169, 171, 174). 
Between Point 6 and the point designated as Point 
1 on Plaintiff's Exhibits 5 and 6 were several scrapes, 
scratches and gouges in the highway. Point 1 on Exhihib; 
5 and 6 designates the farthest mark north (Tr. 35). 11 
was a rubber scuff mark about twenty inches wide with 
a scrape in the center. (Plaintiff's Exhibits 4 and G). 
The center of this mark was forty-nine inches from th1 
center of the white center line (Tr. 32). The easternmo~t 
(•dge of this mark was sixty inches from the cPntPr of tltl' 
white line (Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, Tr. 33). rrhe onbi<l1' 
dimension of the 1962 Volkswagen was sixty inche8 anJ 
the distance from the outside of one front tire to tlw out-
side of the otlwr front tire was fift)'-fom inches ('l'r. 5-±i 
'l'o the south of these marks one hundred five inches frolll 
Point No. 1 was a skid mark commencing at a voint 011 1• 
foot seven inches into the west lane and running 1'a~t 
towards the point at whirh the VolkswagPn came to iw! 
'l'he north bPginning point of this skid mark was identi 
fied as Point 2 on I~xhibits 5 and 6 (Tr. :-35, 36). Offic• 1 
Bnrch testi fit>d that this skid mark was made h.1· ti, .. 
\Tolkswagen (Tr. 37). The point of impact was plact'd 1.1 
Officer Burch and Rngeant RP.id at the- area of tlw g-nu~' 
marks rnarkPd as Point l and () on Exhibits 5 aud 1 ; 
'rlwse marks and the serap<~ marks lwtwePn tlwm \\ 1' 1 
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11rnue by tl1e Volkswagen at the time of impact (Tr. 96). 
The point of maximum engagement could have been at 
f'oint 6 (Tr. 184, 185). 
rclie photograph marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 6 shows 
thP position of the Volkswagen after the accident. The 
photograph marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 11 shows the 
damage to the front of the Volkswagen. The front end was 
collapsPd and its wheels were collapsed to the right. 
The bodies of Frederick Kenneth Spendlove and a 
~Ir. Condie ·were both on the left-hand side of the Volks-
ll'agm at the place where the Volkswagen came to rest. 
Jn the opinion of Officer Burch, both were thrown from 
t tliG Volkswagen as it came off the paved portion of the 
highway onto the gravel shoulder (Tr. 113). There were 
110 skid marks or other markings on the highway to indi-
1·ah• any action ·was taken by the Volkswagen to stop or 
11thP1wise avoid the collision (Tr. 63, 64). The north-
l1n1rnd traffic lane (the Volkswagen's side of the road) 




THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO DIRECT 
I VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT. 
':t1 he oft repeated principle upon which the instant 
1 a~c· must be resoh'ed is that the issue of negligence is a 
111n· isslw unless the evidence or lack thereof is so clear 
6 
that reasonable minds cannot differ. Hindmarsh v. 0.1!. 
Skaggs Foodliner, 21 Utah 2d 413, 446 P.2d 410 (19G8J: 
Gibbs v. Blue Cab Inc., 122 Utah 312, 249 P.2d 213 (19~1~1 
and Aagard v. Dayton & Miller Red-E-lllix Co11crete Co .. 
12 Utah 2d 34, 3Gl P.2d 582 (1960). If there is support 
in the evidence for the jury verdict, it must be affimJPd. 
Of course, every reasonable inference must be resolnd 
in favor of the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff contends that the presumption of dnc cm 
much stressed in defendant's brief was not applicable to 
the case and that the Trial Court should not have giwn 
the jury Instruction 22 concerning it. 
Wood v. Strei:ell-Patterson Hardware Co., 6 Utal1 2d 
340, 313 P.2d 800 (1957) dealt most recently with this 
presumption a it rt>laks to a no eyewitness head-on col 
lision. rl'lw Court observed there ·was great confusion H' 
to the presumption hut held that certain infc~rences of fad 
arose from conditions existing on the highway at the point 
of impact from which negligence from being on the wro11.~ 
side of the highway could be presumed. This was son'-
gardless of the fact that the driver was not alin~ to ('\-
plain wh~- he was over the line. Physical evidence alow 
was held sufficient to support the Trial Court's findi11.~ 
of negligen<'<'. 
As pointt>d ont hy .J usticc'. ·w olfe in his dissent in~ 
opinion in Mec71r1111 v. Allen, 1 Utah 2d 79, 2G2 P.'..!d 2:-::i 
(1953), tlw pn·smnption of duP care should he gi\'P11 lilli 
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force and should disappear in the face of any evidence of 
latk of due care since the real inquiry is how the actors 
adPd in the case before the Court. 
Plaintiff submits that if any presumption applies in 
thl' instant case it is a presumption of negligence on the 
jJart of both drivers for being partially on the wrong side 
of the road at the time of impact. Morrison v. Perry, 
111-l: TTtah 151, 140 P.2d 772 (1943). Experience certainly 
shows that accidents usnally do not happen absent fault 
on the part of the drivers and that a careful experienced 
(lriwr will nParly always h<~ able to avoid accidents with 
fa11lty dl'ivers. rrhe Court went so far as to state in Gibbs 
1. TJ/1w Call Inc., 122 Utah 312, 249 P.2d 213 (1952), 
tltt1t "\Ve have been prone to assmne that someone niitst 
li<t\'P lwrn guilty in an intersection collision." 249 P.2d 
:11 '.'.1 (i. rl'll<' prPsnrnption of due can~ exists merely as a 
1:rnr(·dural d('vice requiring he who asserts the contrary 
lo go l'orwarcl ·with tht• proof. If the proof shows a driver 
l 1l lut\'<' lw<'n violating a rnle of tlw road at the instant 
;in :w1·id<'nt oecnn;, it is manifestly reasonable to presume 
(':tnsativ<' n<>gligence from the violation. He is caught as 
it \1 <'l'P in the v<>ry act and has himself rebutted the gen-
r·ral pn'snmption of clue care which might otherwise ap-
11k. A<'.eordingly, plaintiff submits that no instruction 
•111 tli<e prPsnmption of dne care should have been given. 
( !hurla 1·. Rose, 5 Utah 2d 39, 296 P.2d 287 (1956); cf. 
w,J,lr/ /'. 8trr1•rll-Patterson Hardware Co., S1tpra. 
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The rules of the road applicable to Frederick Ken 
neth Spendlove at the time and place of the accidPnt wel'f' 
as defined by the Trial Court in Instruction No. 24: 
It was the duty of the decedent Frederick 
Kenneth Spendlove to use reasonable care under 
the circumstances in driving his car to avoid dan-
ger to himself and others and to observe and be 
aware of the condition of the highway, the traffit-
thEffeon, and other existing conditions; in that l'P-
gard, he was obliged: 
A. To use reasonable care to keep a look 
out for other vehicles and obstacles or othn con-
ditions n~asonably to he anticipated. 
B. To keep his car under reasonably saf( 
and proper control. 
C. Upon a landed highway to drive as nearly 
as practicable entirely within a single lane awl 
not to move from one lane to another until tl1e 
driver has first ascertained that he can do so \rilh 
reasonahle saft>ty. 
D. To driv(~ his automobile on his own right 
side that is, the east side of tht> highway. 
11J. To keep a lookont for persons and otlw 1• 
vehicles upon tlw highway, and whenwT it aprwn 1' 
to be reasonahlv m'cessarv in the exercise of d111 • 
can~ for thP sa f~ty of hims.elf or others, to tnrn liic 
vehirle to tli<> ontsid<· of tlw highway to iwoid n 
collision. 
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Failure of the said Frederick Kenneth Spend-
love to operate his automobile in accordance with 
the foregoing requirements of the law would con-
stitute negligence on his part. 
rl'he duties defined in Instruction 24 are founded at 
ll'ast in part in the following Utah statutes: 
No person shall drive a vehicle on a highway 
at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent 
under the conditions and having regard to the 
actual and potential hazards then existing. In 
Pvery event speed shall be so controlled as may be 
Il<'eessary to avoid colliding with any person, ve-
hicle, or other conve:vance on or entering the 
highwa>r in compliance with legal requirements 
and the dnty of all persons to use due care. Sec-
tion 4l-G-4G(l), Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
Fpon all roadways of sufficient width a ve-
liiel!~ shall hP driven upon the right half of the 
rnadwa>- ... Section 41-6-53(a), Utah Code Anno-
tn tPd ( 10!'):3). 
Driwrs of n'hiclPs proceeding in opposite 
din,ctions shall pass each other to the right and 
tqJon roadways having width for not more than 
one lane of traffic in each direction, each driver 
shall give to the other at least one-half of the main 
trawl0d portion of the roadway as nearly as possi-
l)!P. S<>ction 41-6-54, Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
\VhPnever any roadwavs has been divided 
into two or more ~learlv rna~ked lanes for traffic 
th<> following rules in addition to all others con-
sistPnt 11er0with slrnll appl:v: 
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(a) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as 
practical entirely within a single lane and shall 
not be moved from such lane until the driver ha,, 
first ascertained that such movement can lw 
made with safety. Section 41-6-61(a), Utah Co<lP 
Annotated (1953). 
Having the duty of the defendant's decedent in view, 
the jury could reasonably find from the evidence: 
1. The DeMille car was headed south at the 
time of the accident. The DeMilles had left Cedar City 
to travel to Las Vegas that morning and were obst~rverl 
at a Cedar City service station just twenty minutes hefore 
the accident. In Tuttle v. Intermountain Express Co,. 
121 Utah 48, 242 P.2d 764 (1952), a similar finding 011 
similar evidence was held reasonable even though t\\'0 
eyt>wihwsses tt>stifit>d to the contrary. 
2. The Spendlove automobile was traveling north 
at the time of the accident. The position of tlw 
skids, scrapes and gouges found at the point of irnpal't 
and the fact the DeMille automobile was headed soutl1 
prior to the accident and the position of the automobi!Ps 
on the highvmy after the collision leave no room for an,1 
other conclusion. 
3. Defendant's decedent negligently failed tu 
k0e-p a proper lookout. rrhe day ·was clear and visibilit 1 
nnol1strnctt>d looking s<'veral lrnndrt>d yards up the higlt 
11 
way north to the place of the accident. No skid marks or 
other marks on the highway showed that defendant's de-
c·cdent even saw the DeMille automobile before the col-
lision. Ba1imler v. Hazelwood, 347 S.W. 2d 560 (Tex. 
1%1), and Wilson v. Barnes, 224 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Ct. 
Civ. App. 1949). 
4. Defendant's decedent failed to keep his car 
nnder reasonably safe and proper control. The damage 
to the automobiles and the positions at which they came 
lo rest show they collided with great force and that the 
\'olhwagen had been traveling at great speed prior to 
the impact. No evidence of evasive action existed on the 
part of defendant's decedent. The very fact the accident 
11c(•ttrred on a clear straight stretch of road gives rise to 
nn inforence of lack of proper control. 
5. Defendant's decedent nt>gligently failed to keep 
his automobile properly within his own lane; negli-
g-1•ntly moved therefrom when he could not do so with 
rPasonahle safrty; negligentl!' failed to keep right and 
negligently failed to turn right to avoid a collision. A 
µ;onge mark running to the white center line was made by 
a "harp portion of the Volkswagen's undercarriage. The 
<'<'11kr of the scuff mark made by the Volkswagen's right 
lrnnt tirP and wheel was only forty-nine inches from the 
""11t<>r line, whereas the outside dimension of the Volks-
\\ ag·<·n was sixty inches. A skid mark made by the Volks-
1! ;1g-<·n in the collision commenced one foot seven inches 
J2 
in the west lane. The northbound traffic lane was sixken 
feet four inches wide at the point of collision. From tht-oe 
uncontroverted facts, the jury could reasonably find that ' 
the Volkswagen ·was well acro:o;s the center line at tlie 
moment of impact. Viewing the facts in the light rno~t 
favorable to plaintiff, the Court must assume that the 
Volkswagen was across the center line at the time of the 
collision. Furthermore, if it had only been riding thP 
white line or traveling close to the white line, such con-
duct under the circumstances was negligent as a matter 
of law. Farrell v. Camrron, 98 Utah 68, 94 P.2d 106~ 
(1939); Foder v. Interstate Transit Lines, 86 P.2d 57-1 
(Kan. 1939); In re Starer's Estate, 383 P.2d 95G (Kan. 
19()8); Gerard v. Peasley, 403 P.2d 45 (Wash. 19o5); In 
T<' Armstrong's Estate, 311 P.2d 281 (Kan. 1957); Trnc11 
n. GitiMini, G6 P.2cl 675 (Dist. Ct. App. Cal. 1937); a11 1l 
Rller n. Uniterl States, lrifi F. Supp. 273 (vV.D.N.C. 1%7). 
At i.IH• moment of impact the VolkswagPn was aero~,; 
the white center linP in violation of an express provi~io11 
of the statute, ·while at least ek•ven feet of 01H'n 11noh-
strncted roadway n•rnainPd for its use in its own IHJ11'. 
The total ahsence of marks on the highway show it mad(' 
no effort to stop or turn right to avoid the Dr:\lilk 
antmnobik•. Plaintiff concedes that thr rPaosn !'or t\ 11 
prP:-;pnce of thP Dc•.Mille antomobi!P acrnss th<> c<'nll'l 
linP at tlw point of impac-t is nnelear. NFY<'rtli<>I"""· i1 i' 
el<·ar that T'<;ny L<•c• J)p-;\Jille had just \pft 'Ct>dar ('it\ to 
start a trip. F'irt<·<·11 minut<>s lwforp the accident k \\'!I" 
lirig·lit and alc'rt and 1ya:~ <lriYing a c\pan, was!H·rl a11t 1 ' 
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mohilP. The Conrt refused to allow presentation of his 
P:-.cell<•nt driving record to the jury. No evidence was 
pn'sPnted by defendant as to how long the Volkswagen 
J1ad been on the road that hour of the morning. From the 
]JOsition of the damage to the Volkswagen and the fact 
tlie skid mark left by one of the Volkswagen's rear tires 
eo11mtenced in the west lane, the jury could reasonably 
find that the Vollrnwagen was headed not straight up the 
highway but angling northeast to get back in its own 
lane at the time of the collision and that the DeMille auto-
mobile had crossed the center line to avoid striking the 
\'olks11'agen. 
Ln any rvent, the physical evidence showing the place 
111' impact alone> fully supports a sufficient inference of 
1wgligence on the vart of defendant's decedent to justify 
th8 'l'rial Conrt in submitting the issne of his negligence 
lo tl1t1 jllry. 
Ln Farrell v. Cameron, sitpra, the plaintiff 1,yas in-
j1u·pd while riding as a passenger in an automobile which 
''l1l'l'oadwd tweln-' to sixken inches over the center line 
and eollidNl with defendant's automobile. The defendant 
kul rai]('d to slow down or turn to the right in a\'Oidance 
11 1 iii(• eoilision. The Conrt stressed tht> following princi-
111··:- npplieah\P l!PrP: 
1. It makes no differencP which of two drivers in 
:111 :\('('i(l<•nt was the rnon: 1wgligent. If the defendant was 
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negligent and his guilt was a proximate cause of the acci-
dent, the plaintiff can recover. 
2. Every driver who is taking reasonable care will 
not consider whether an approaching driver is on his 
side of the road or not where he has ample time and space 
to do so but will move over and not take a chance and 
avoid a collision. Failure so to do is negligence. 
3. A statute requires drivers to drive as close t0 
the right hand curb or edge as possible. Where a driver 
is traveling within sixteen inches of the center line at a 
point on the highway where there is ample space to driv1· 
enough nearer the right hand edge of highway to avoid a 
collision, his failure to <lo so is negligence. 
4. It is the duty of the driver who is on his right 
hand side of the street to use reasonable care to avoid a 
collision enm if the approaching car is being driven on 
the ·wrong side of the street in violation of the law of tlw 
road. 
5. The issue is always a question of fact and to 
justify overturning the lower Court the Supreme Conrl 
must find no negligence as a matter of law. 
G. Although one is more negligent than the otlw1 
in a head-on colfo>ion, tlw negligence of each driwr oec1ir 
ring concurrently and simnltaneously is a proxirnate 
cause of thP collision. 
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In a concurring opinion Justice Pratt stated: 
Even though one driver is upon the wrong 
side of the road, the approaching driver who is on 
his proper side is not relieved of the duty of exer-
cising reasonable care to avoid a collision. The 
latter may asusme that the former will resume his 
proper side, but that assumption, of course, does 
not remain with him indefinitely. There may come 
the time when a reasonably prudent person would 
realize that he, who is on the wrong side of the 
road, is not going to resume his proper position. 
If, when this realization should arise in the mind 
of the driver approaching upon his proper side of 
the road, he, through inability to see, or by reason 
of speed, is unable to exercise control of his car, 
then he is negligent; and where the circumstances 
are such that had he controlled his car as a reason-
ably prudent person would have done, he could 
have avoided the collision, then his negligence 
was a proximate cause thereof. 
Jn Foder v. Interstate Transit Lines, sitpra, the evi-
1l<•ncP was in conflict as to whether the truck or the bus 
inrn]\·pd had encroaclwd upon or across the center line. 
'l'h(·n~ was evidence that the bus was at least hugging 
tlw center line at the time of impact. The Court stated: 
The fact is that the wheels of each vehicle 
could be on the right side of the middle mark, 
bnt right up to it, and due to the part of each ve-
hicle that extends beyond the wheels a collision 
snrh as WE' have hne could have taken place. 
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. . . both drivers were negligent under thl' 
circumstances in being right up to the middle 
mark regardless of which one crossed it. 
The plaintiff, a passenger in the bus, was held entitled 
to recovf'r. 
Gerard v. Peasley, 403 P.2d 45 (Wash. 1965), in-
volved a collision betwef'n a pick-up and a Volkswagen 
on a curve on a dark rainy night. The evidence was con-
flicting as to which vehicle had encroached over the rt'n 
ter line so the Court affirmed a verdict for tlw plaintiff 
holding the conflid a mattf'r for the jnry. 
In re Armtsrong's Estate, 311 P.2d (Kan. 1957), in 
volved a no eyewitnc>ss head-on collision on a straight 
road on a clear day. rrirn road ran east and west. It 11w 
twt>nt~·-six fr<>t wi<l<~ and was marked ·with a ct>nt(']' liIH' 
with thirtven feet on each side. A windrow of graV('l wn. 
on the north half of the north lane. It varied from fonr 
and one-half feet to six feet wide, leaving seven fed in 1h1 
north lane. Vehicle A was traveling east, Vehicle H we~d. 
V<>hicle A was obserYed by several to be encroarliiu;.; 
aeross the centf'r line as it traveled east lwfore tlw rol 
lision. Y<'hicle H left skid marks tlm:•e feet across 11 11 
cmter li1w prior to tlw collision. The l<'ft four-fifth' 
of each YPhiclc• had collidvd. Tlwre was room for Y(·lticl · 
H to traYPl in thv north lmw lwtwePn tl1<• windrow and 
th<' centPr lin<'. r111ic· rl'rial Conrt disrnissed H's l'HS!' ai'tet 
his <'V; dPnCP \YHS pn ·~'<'llfrd. 'l'lH' Sn prelll<' Coll rt n·yel':I'• ! 
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un the basis the evidence was for the jury since reason-
able minds could differ as to negligence and cause. A 
rfosenting opinion stated the facts showed contributory 
negligence on the part of Vehicle H as a matter of law 
~inre H was charged by law with seeing the approach 
of \T ehicle A and with knowing the condition of the road 
at bme and place. In the exercise of due care H could 
have avoided a collision with Vehicle A even though 
\'l•hicle A was encroaching on H's side of the road. H 
liad amplP room to avoid the collision if H had stayed on 
hi~ Ride of the road. The 1Court cited the rule that where 
both \"t>hicles crowd the center, both are deemed neglig('nt 
a~ a mattPr of law. 
Tracy v. Gitibbini, 66 P.2d 675 (Dist. Ct. of App. Cal. 
Hl::l7), also involved a no eyewitness head-on collision. 
Tlw plaintiff sued her driYer and others and one defend-
ant appealPd the judgment recovered. The right front of 
1«wlt car was damaged and gonges or scratches on both 
:id<•:-; of th<~ center line showed the point of impact. The 
l1igliway wa~ bwnt~T-six fe('t wide with eight feet shoul-
dtTO'. rl'lH• Court held the evidence ample to support a 
1·Prdict for plaintiff where the physical facts compelled 
the inference that the appellant was over the center line. 
'\'his fact alone was held sufficient to make out a case of 
n1·glig-Pnce sufficient to go to the jury. To the same effect 
ctr:· In re Starer's Estate, 383 P.2d 956 (Kan.1963); Eller 
1 l "11ited States, 155 F. Supp. 273 (W.D.N.C. 1957) and 
IJ11.1;11s 1·. B11rkr, 257 P.2d 1964 (Kan. 1963). In Briggs 
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the rrrial Court nonsuited the plaintiff after presenta 
tion of evidence and the Kansas SuprPmc Court reversed. 1 
holding the circumstantial evidence sufficient to go t11 1 
jury. A Buick in which the plaintiff's lrnshand 1vas a t,'ltPil 
was hPaded south. Defendant's truck was headed nortl1. 
rrhc driver of the Buick was a careful and prudent drinr 
and the Buick was in good mechanical condition. Th1' 
collision took place in broad daylight on a dry road nnd1'r 
no condition which would have impaired road visibilit). 
8cveral witnesses observed defendants' heavily loatlPil 
truck traveling north before the accident and that it oct'n 
sionally crossed the Cl~nter line with its left wheels. Botl1 
wrecked vehicles eame to rest on the cast side of the road. 
A skid mark forty-four fret long ran from thP IYPSt ]alJI' 
into the east lane to the point wlwre the accidl,nt occurred 
Therp ·was a gonge mark one and one-half feet wPsi of tlii 
c!'nter lin0. Tlw Buick was apparently headed sontlwa:-1 
at tlw tirne ot' the eollision. Its right side was damag~d. 
'L'he right front part of the truck had apparently strnti1 
the Buick. An officer fixed the point of impact fon: 
fret east of tlw center line. In his opinion the trnck wn · 
mostly on the east side of the road. Another witlll'Sc 
t<:•stifiPd 110 saw a dust eloud from his home aris<' f'row 
the accidPnt wltieh a1nwared in the cvnter or just we~t ,,[ 
thP c<>nter of tl1P rnad. Tht• smiw wi tm·ss tPst if i Pd IH' ~<1 '' 
mud tracks sonth of' tltt• aeeid\'nt 1d1er<> a car liad colllf' 1tll 
tlw hig111n1:i· and tl1<>n traveled lmek onto the east :o;itl» id 
t1H' hip;liwa:i· leaving mrn1 trneb; on th<> mad. 
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'l'he Court observed it was required to view the evi-
dence in the light most favorable to plaintiff to determine 
if rPasonable men could come to different conclusions as 
to whose negligence could have caused the accident. If it 
determined such to be the case, plaintiff's case was suffi-
( iPnt to go to the jury. The Court held the fact that the 
trnck had been observed occasionally crossing the center 
line lwfore the accident and conld have been found to have 
hPen 1mrtially across the center line at the time of the 
accidPnt had a reasonable relation to the accident. The 
wPig·ht and probative force of all the evidence were for 
th1• j 11r:-·. 
'L'lw jmy was compelled to find the driver of the 
\'ollrnwagen negligent in crossing or even crowding the 
1·enter line under the circumstances presented in the 
m:-;tant case. This fact won1d have fully justified the Trial 
Court in directing a verdict in favor of the minor children 
11[ Constance Hope De Mille. 
lh~fondnnt nrges the Court to accept the statement 
of tlH· Iowa Court in Bokhoven v. Hitll, 247 Iowa 604, 75 
S.W.2d 225 (1956), as to the standard of proof required 
in 1·.a~ws resting on circumstantial evidence. This standard, 
h1,1r0ver, ·was rejected by the Utah Supreme Court in 
ll'ood 11 • Strevell-Patterson Hardware Co., G Utah 2d 340, 
:i:-i l).2d 800 (1957), in which it was held that negligence 
1
•11uld h(, inferred from the sole fact the impact took place 
''il d1'frndant's side of the road. 'l'he rule which is applied 
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not only in Utah but by most other jurisdictions is tl1at 
the circurnstantial evidence need not exclude any anrl 
every other reasonable hypothesis but will be sufficient 
if it agrees with the hypothesis it is adduced to prov1. 
As between two or more reasonable hypotheses from 
circumstantial evidence, the Court is not at liberty to 
direct which one the jury must adopt. Briggs v. Burke. 
257 P.2d 164 (Kan. 1953). 
Defendant urges as true certain opinions of the offi 
crs as to the manner in which the Volkswagen made tli1· 
skid mark commencing in the W(•st lim•. 
Plaintiff submits the jnry was as well able to hypo 
thesize the movements of the Y ollrnwagen which madr tlw 
mark as the officers once the nature, size and location 
of the marks were l)laced in evidence and the location 
and <'Xt<>nt of tlw damage to tlw automobile wen .. • sl1ow11. 
Certainly rPasonahle minds could differ as to tlw r:v 
act manner in which snch skid mark was made but the fad 
it -was made starting in the west lane whereas the Volks- 1 
'Nagen came to rest in the east lane is certainly evidenc1• 
from which rmsonable minds could infer that the Voll'' 
·wagen was across the center line at the time of the colli 
sion in violation of the rulPs of the road, its driver nol 
having looked, or having looked, not having seen that 
clearly visihl<>, or having looked and seen, not havin~ 
hn1kc·cl nor tnnwd to m·oid a eollision .. Had the Yolk:o 
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1ragen be€n abiding the rule requiring it to travel as close 
to tlrn right hand edge of the roadway as possible, there 
would have been at least six or seven feet between it and 
thP DeMille automobile. This is so even assuming that 
the De Mille automobile was three or even four feet into 
the east lane. Had the Volkswagen even been traveling in 
the center of its lane, the accident 'would have been 
arnided. 
Plaintiff submits that it is extremely difficult to 
postulate a situation consistent with the facts li1 which 
th(' acccident could have happened absent contributing 
t·ansative negligence on the part of defendant's decedent. 
As a minimum, the evidence was such that reasonable 
minds could come to the conclusion that negligence on 
tlw part of Frederick Keennth Spendlove proximately 
(·ausPd the accident. Certainly this was the opinion of the 
Trial Conrt and the jury did come to such a conclusion. 
llt·frndant is simply unwilling to allow plaintiff's evi-
dPJH't' thP reasonable effect to which it is entitled under 
the law and ·which it naturally had before a jury, all or 
inost of whom were doubtless drivers themselves. 
Def t•ndant's position is plainly untenable for defend-
ant nrges the Court, in effect, to repudiate the rule of 
Woad 1.'. Strevell-Patterson Hardware Co., 6 Utah 2d 
:-i±ll, :31:3 P.2d 800 (1957), and to ignore completely the 
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presumption of negligence arising from the violation of 
rules of the road in process at the moment of the accident. 
Morrison v. Perry, 104Utah151, 140 P.2d 772 (1943). 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION 
NO. 24. 
'11 he evidence hereinabm'e ref erred to was ample 
foundation for the giving of all of Instruction 24. Thr 
jury conld certainly find defendant's decedent failed to 
keep a proper lookout ·when he collided with the Del\Iillr 
vehicle on a clear day ·with his visibility unobstructed fo1 
several hnndred yards before he reached the point of 
imvact. The jury made such a finding on the part of botli 
driwrs in Wilson v. Barnes, 224 S."W. 2d 892 (Tex. Ct. 
Civ. App. 1949), in a fact situation closely parall0l to tlw 
instant case where tlwrc ·was only one hundred yards vi~i­
hi I it:; on tlw part of one driver to thP place of impact. 
Defendant's dececknt CPrtainly failed to hep his car 
under proper control whPre he collided with the DeMilk 
car under circumstances fairly shouting that he eithN 
failed to make an effort to control or could not snffici<'nt 
ly control his own Vl'hicle in avoidance of the accid(•nt. 
'11h0 jnry could have r0asonably inferred from th 1 
manner in \Yhich t]1p Yolks\\·agen was damaged tliat it WH-' 
trnv<•linp: not <hw north hnt i:;Jightly nortl11:.·ast at the tiuw 
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of the collision back into its own lane. This would also 
he entirely consistent with the scruff mark, gouges and 
skids it made on the road. The only conclusion to be 
drawn from such hypothesis would be that the Volks-
wagen had moved from its proper lane into the west 
lane at a point where the collision proved it could not 
do so with reasonable safety. 
Certainly the evidence supports the conclusion the 
\'olkswagen was not entirely within its own lane. 
The opinion evidence elicited by defendant from Offi-
'"'r Burch and Sergeant Reid was to the effect that the 
l'ollrnwagen was probably proceeding directly north at 
tlw ti1m~ of impact. '!'his evidence coupled with the marks 
on the highway support the conclusion the Volkswagen 
!'ailed to turn to the right to avoid the collission, failed 
to trawl as close to the right hand edge of the road as 
p1aeticable and failed to do anything but proceed blindly 
:clong- as though thP drivPr "\\'t're asleep. 
]<~yen if one or more of the driving duties set forth 
in tlw Instruction had been irrelevant under the evidence, 
tlw giving of the instruction was not prejudicial error 
when viewed in the context of the instructions as a whole. 
lnstrnction 17 required plaintiff to show negligence by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Instruction 19 covered 
l]ip unavoidable accident possibility. Instruction 20 
;;tu.tecl the inapplicability of res ipsa loquitor. Instruction 
•:: informed th(' jury that no exceptional caution was 
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rrqnired on tl10 part of the defrndant's drcedent. Imtn1, 
tion 2-1 again emphasized that both negligf•nce in one ur 
more particulars and proximate cause had to exist before 
plaintiff was rntit!Pd to r<>covPr. 
None of the cases cited by defendant under Point 
II of dPfendant's brid" :;;how Prror in Instruction 24 and 
a r<' mu ppropos. 
Jackson v. Colston, 11() Utah 295, 209 P.2cl :i111~ 
( 1!)-1!)), was snit for burns invoh·ing n·s i psa loqni tor a11:! 
a difficnlt proximate canse issue. Dern l11veslllu'1it Cu. 1. 
Carbon County J,a11rl Co., 9·1 Ftah 7G, 75 P.2d GGO (lU:J~,. · 
was a snit on a notl> and mortgag<•, an l'qnity casl'. 87iidrl 
I'. Utah Li_r1lit & Trnctio11 Co ... !J9 lltah 307, 105 P.Jcl :;1; 
(I ~HO), involnd tlw l'Pading of the complaint and statut1· 
to tl1P jury, ll<'ithn of 1d1id1 thP 'I1rial Court did 11Pr1• 
P({rk('r 1·. J:11ntfJl'r,r;rT, 100 Utah :)\il, 11() I'.:.!cl J'.2::> (1D-l1!. I 
was n railroad crossing accident in which a jnry vPrdi1'' ' 
for tlw plaintiff was affinrn•d on the basis of conflictin~ 
circumstantial evidenc<' as to tlw speed of the train anr! 
propl'r Ol'('ration of thl' crossing signal. 'l'he Supr~11 1 
Conrt ohserv<•d that <'ven thongh an instruction as to tit' 
neglig<'llCP of tlH• drinr of the car plaintiff was riding ii' 
was e1T01wous since extraneous to the issues, it \Iii' 
harml('SS <'lTOr wlwn vi(•\n•d in tlil' <'Ol11Pxt of tit<• instrw 
tions as a wl10!1'. Jlol'l'i.,011 r. Pcrr,1;. 10-~ Utah 151, 1+' 
P.:2(1 ( L!J--l::l), invoh <·<1 m1 instrndion 011 control of an nnl 1' 
rnoliil(' witl1in 111<' 1:uu_1y of i!Jt• driv<·r's \'ision whil'l1 ll 1 • 
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Conrt held inappropriate without discussion. Coray v. 
Su11t71rrn Pacific Co., 119 Utah 1, 223 P.2d 819 (1950), 
invuh·ed an erroneous instruction that an employee was 
n'qui red to choose a safe method of work. In Moore v. 
J!, 11rer & Rio Grande Western Railroad, 4 Utah 2d 255, 
~92 P.2d 849 (1956), the Court held the admission of medi-
ial evicknce as to possibilities in error. Johnson v. May-
1wrd, 9 Utah 2d 268, 342 P.2d 884 (1959), reversed a 
verdid for defendant on the gronnds the evidence made a 
taSl' for the jury and that under no view of the evidence 
r·rrnlrl plaintiff be fonnd to have assumed a risk. 
CONCLFSION 
rche Trial Court should have found the defendant's 
:lr,cedent Frederick Kenneth Spendlove gnilty of negli-
: "l'llC:i' proximately contributing to the accident as a mat-
11·r of law because the undisputed physical evidence 
,\10\n•d him to be in violation of applicable rules of the 
1·11Ml dt>signed to prevent collisions at the instant the 
11 1Tid<•nt occurred. 
~'his not having been done, the Trial Court properly 
'llhmitting the case to the jury because reasonable minds 
•·iinl<l rE>asonably find from the circumstantial evidence 
1rioduced that negligence on the part of defendant's de-
'"dPnt was a proximate cause of the collision and the loss 
.,f tho mother of the two small children represented by 
ilainti ff. 
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Dl·l'vndani. ha:-; not :-;hmn1 C'rror m th<· in~lrmti:i1 
and ii vrrnr ti}('!'\' lw it wa:-; l1arml<>ss in Yi('\\' of tJ:i. :1 
stn1etion:-; wh<·n \'iewed a:-; a wholP >vhicli \\ ('J'P VP!')' im111 
ahl<' to tliP <l(•frndant. 
'i'lH' jndg111Pnt of the Trial Court should])(_> affirn11"I 
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